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I.

INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this article is to set out the salience of a theory
about civil procedure and to suggest a policy-oriented jurisprudential
framework to secure that end. A policy-oriented jurisprudential
framework should give a realistic theoretical framework that is needed

"*Professor of Law, University of Florida; B.A. (law), 1964, South Africa; B.A. (Juris.), 1966,
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to improve the way the subject is taught, thought about, and applied
in the real world. First, there is no theory that has explanatory power
that will eliminate the "strangeness" of procedure, not only for lawyers
and students but also for others with diverse disciplinary backgrounds.
This means a conceptual basis is needed for civil procedure that has
explanatory power so that descriptions of procedural systems will
inform us about what we know and do not know about civil procedure
as an operational system.
Second, a theory about civil procedure must have descriptive utility
that will improve the knowledge base about procedure. This should
facilitate policy and value clarification with reference to real problems
and issues, which will in turn generate explicit standards of normative
guidance. Such standards should enable us to reach down from abstract
normative principles, and up from problem-specific detail, to reach
solutions to decisional problems that are realistic as well as normatively
satisfying in their congruence with the perceived and clarified common
interest.
It is a simple matter for a student or lay person to conceptualize
a negligent or malicious act, envision a theft, or ponder the breach of
a contract for sale. Yet it is quite another thing to visualize, much
less experience, the thrill of an action for replevin, the aesthetics of
a perfectly executed quasi in rem procedure, or the intellectual satisfaction of the successful use of the offensive collateral estoppel aspect
of res judicata.'

1. Even the most casual perusal of the literature of civil procedure will quickly disclose
that it has generated no coherent, unified, comprehensive conceptual framework. According to
Professor Rosenberg, civil procedure is "riddled with archaic rigidities and indefensible
paradoxes. It is often sluggish and irrational. As an instrument for resolving disputes, its
greatest redeeming feature is that it stands alongside our system of criminal justice, where its
warts seem beauty marks by contrast. It will improve; it must." Rosenberg, Devising Procedures
That Are Civil to Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 819 (1971).
If the casebooks are a good indicator of the state of procedure theory, they in effect represent
a nuanced hodge-podge of topics, frequently leaving their conceptual or pedagogical integration
to the instructor's fancy, or lack thereof. For a representative illustration, see J. COUND, A.
MILLER, & J. FREIDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (1980). The orientation of the book suffers
from the fact that the different authors bring diverse 'implicit" jurisprudential assumptions that
are frequently incompatible. Thus, the promise of the book seems to be a complex admixture
of functionalism and realism, but this quickly dissolves into a fine-tuned analytical mode, in
keeping with the best of the analytical, positivist tradition. As this mode preempts others,
procedure becomes increasingly divorced from the contextual background that generates the
procedural problems in the first place.
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First year students begin civil procedure with high expectations
that the course holds the key to the business of lawyering. Those
same students frequently experience a measure of cognitive dissonance
as they confront not the concrete circumstances of tortious or criminal
conduct, but the variability and ambiguity of a complex and technical
legal language game - a game whose opaque values and archaic and
abstract nomenclature provide a treacherous landscape to the naive
and intellectually inert. Yet as practitioners wade through the procedural swamp, they often recognize, as many students do not, that
the rules have a power-affinity, that they are central to the business
of choice in law, and that they exert extraordinary influence over the
larger process of decisionmaking we call "law." The lawyer who is a
virtuoso with the rules, whether his case is strong or weak, can exercise a great measure of influence over who wins and who loses in the
final determination of a law suit.
From the perspective of the practical lawyer, the adversary process
is sometimes seen as a symbolic version of trial by battle. It combines
the mastery of weapons (procedural tools) with craft-skills of theatrical
presence in an often ritualized contest, sometimes seen as an intrinsic
"good." From the observer's perspective, however, the lawyer's tactical and strategic skill and mastery over the weapons of litigation
(procedural rules) result inevitably in someone winning and someone
losing.
This article focuses broadly on what I believe to be a vacuum. This
vacuum exists between the lawyers' perceptions of procedure, perceptions that elevate procedure to almost sacrosanct levels, and the perceptions of scientific observers who, like clients and potential clients,
have no idea what civil procedure is, but whose attitudes to legal
procedure are often characterized by high degrees of alienation2 toward arcane and esoteric legal procedures collectively (not to mention
pejoratively) labeled "technicalities." These technicalities often provide
access to the more favored things in our social and political lives.
More pertinently, I will try to underscore the importance of efforts
to theorize about civil procedure from the vantage point of the observer,3 rather than efforts to theorize of procedure from the vantage

2. See generally Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy in the Structure of Procedure, in THE
STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE, 48 R. COVER & 0. FISS (1979) (critique of lawyering and loss

of client autonomy).
3. On the importance of theories about law and the standpoint of the observer, see generally
Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: MaintainingObservationalStandpoint
and Delimiting the Focus of Inquiry, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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point of the practitioner. Despite many other modes of important

procedural study, I chose the rules of civil procedure because their
evolution forms the almost quintessential metaphor of what an AngloAmerican lawyer is.
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE:

THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE THEORIZING

Civil procedure is part of a larger process called the constitutive
process. 4 Civil procedure is not the most visible part of the constitutive
process, and is rarely considered an integral part according to conventional theories of constitutional law. Moreover, civil procedure literature frequently views procedure as a subject quite distinct from the
constitutive processes. Practice, however, frequently requires acknowledgment that some rules of civil procedure are indeed of constitutional
significance, or that they are at least indirectly conditioned by constitutional law prescriptions.
A theory about constitutive process that has explanatory or descriptive power must start with an appreciation of the social process or
the contextual background of that process. One of the key background
or contextual features of constitutive process is the community process
of effective power. We contend that civil procedure is a part of "constitutional law" (constitutive process) and for a theory about civil pro-

See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, HUmAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen describe constitutive process as those
[d]ecisions which identify and characterize authoritative decision makers, postulate
and specify basic community policies, establish appropriate structures of authority,
allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures for the
making of different kinds of decisions, and secure performance of all the different
decision functions (intelligence, promotion, prescription, etc.) necessary to the
maintenance and administration of general community policy.
Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
We differentiate the decisions that characterize constitutive process from those of the public
order. "By the 'public order' decisions we refer, more specifically, to those decisions, emerging
as outcomes of the established constitutive process, which shape and maintain the protected
features of the community's various value processes, including the value processes embodied
within human rights." Id.
This distinction is crucial to unravelling, inter alia, the perennial mysteries of what is substance and what is procedure. For a general overview of the policy-oriented conception of law,
see Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971);
see also Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions of Constitutive Process,41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972); McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman,
The World Constitutive Process of AuthoritativeDecision, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 73-154 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969).
4.

ORDER (1980).
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cedure to have explanatory power, it must account for, among other
things, the social process background. More particularly, it must account for the background of power relationships and interactions that
substantially condition constitutional law and civil procedure. Such a
theory alone, however, would be incomplete because decisionmaking

is a dynamic process with ongoing impacts on social and political arrangements. The theory requires a normative component of overriding
community goals to appraise, evaluate, and improve the performance

of an actual civil procedural decision process AClarification of the larger

goals of constitutive process, 6 therefore, is vital to a theory about civil

5. The silly idea that one can meaningfully identify the values and policies of civil procedure
without a descriptive or explanatory theory, or even more simplistically, that one can articulate
all the central policies or norms of procedure without an explanatory theory, is illustrated in
Bayles, Principles For Legal Procedure, 5 LAw & PHILOSOPHY 33, 50-57 (1986) (describing
the process values served by legal procedure).
Even more astounding is the idea that rational policy-making or decisionmaking is purely
an exercise in "logic." Justice Holmes was careful to remind us that the life of the law has not
been logic but experience, a strong caution that rationality cannot be a matter independent of
experience and process so far as law is concerned. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REv. 457 (1897).
Professor Bayles, however, believes that "rationality" is essentially a formal exercise of logic.
The policy-oriented perspective views "logic" alone as inadequate for making rational decisions.
Bayles suggests what he loosely calls process benefits but these benefits are set out without
even a hint at what procedure is, the complex phases of procedural decisional practices, the
relationship of procedure to decisionmaking, or an appreciation of the larger goals of both
constitutive process and public order. Bayles, supra, at 50-57.
6. The preferred goals of constitutive process are set out in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL,
& L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 400-22. Preferred goals are set out for each phase of the constitutive
process. These are briefly set out as follows:
(1) Participation In Decision Making:
(a) Wide representation;
(b) Responsible participation.
(2) Perspectives (preference for common interests rather than special interests):
(a) Demands (values of human dignity maximizing in context, power, wealth,
affection, respect, rectitude, skill, well-being, enlightment);
(b) Identifications (inclusive);
(c) Expectations (maximize realistic orientation to context).
(3) Arenas (policy on establishment to create and maintain authority structures
appropriate to all aspects of constitutive process):
(a) Policy on access (openness and compulsoriness);
(b) Policy on bases of power (maximize authority component of effective control:
the Rule of Law).
(4) Policy on Strategies:
(a) Initiation of process (prompt, non-provocative, fair);
(b)Exploration of potential facts and policies (procedures that are dependable,
contextual, selective, creative);

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 13

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

procedure.7 In addition, an equally compelling challenge is whether
we can supplement the "rules" of civil procedure with a system of
normative guidance for the process of prescription and application to
particular instances requiring decisional responses in civil courts. In
other words, can we invent principles of content and procedure that
will guide the interpretation and application of the "rules" of civil
procedure to secure the larger community concerns? s

(c) Communication (responsivess to actual shared subjectivities of participants);
(d) Implementaton (stress on effectiveness and, where possible, coerciveness).
(5) Outcomes:
(a) Aggregate consequences;
(b) Rationality;
(c) Efficiency;
(d) Inclusivity;
(e) Comprehensiveness and integration as necessary to achieve goals of the
public order.
(6) Goals of Decision Functions:
(a) Intelligence (dependable, comprehensive, selective, timely, creative, open);
(b) Promotion (rationality, integrativeness, comprehensiveness, effectiveness);
(c) Prescription (effectiveness, rationality, inclusiveness);
(d) Invoking (timeliness, dependability, rationality, non-provocativeness, effectiveness);
(e) Application (rationality, realism, uniformity, effectiveness, constructiveness);
(f)Termination (timeliness, comprehensiveness and dependability, balance,
ameliorativeness);
(g) Appraisal (dependability, contextuality, independence, continuity).
Id.
These preferences are policies for constitutive process whose realization provides the best
means to achieve the broader policy of the common interest: that the key values in social process
are abundantly produced and optimally shared.
7. The preferred policies of the applicative decision function cover essentially the same
phases as that of constitutive processes, although the preferred strategies are broader. The
preferred policies for the strategies of the application function are: (1) minimum use of coercion;
(2) net economy in the use of base values; (3) fair procedures perceived as fair; (4) diminishing
conflict in fact; (5) creating enlightenment about objectives of public policy; (6) developing skills
appropriate to protecting the public order; and (7) generalized preference for common interests.
8. Professor Bayles is totally confused about the function of principles of content and procedure. These principles are normative in the sense that they are guides to an optimal or
desirable discharge of a specific decision function: application. Application is itself an aspect of
the decision process; it is a process itself, with identifiable phases of process that interlock with
all other decision functions (prescription, intelligence, invocation, promotion, termination and
appraisal). The function of the principles of procedure and content here recommended is to
assure that all procedure decisions maximize the realization of the more general goals of the
constitutive process, of which civil procedure is a part. And the most general goal policy scientists
recommend for all of the processes of authoritative decision (law) is the goal value of human
dignity. The reduction of policy-oriented thinking - the configurative mode - to a crude

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/13
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Constitutive process is, in itself, an outcome of a relatively discrete
aspect of social process - the power process. Human interactions are
impossible to imagine without regard to some power dimension. Similarly, considering the idea of social process is difficult without accounting for the processes of effective power that are an outcome of it. The
problem of the political foundations of constitutional law is even more
significant for constitutional theory. Constitutional law is an outcome
of the community's processes of effective power. This does not mean
that constitutional law is purely a matter of effective power. It does
mean, however, that the expectations about control and authority
concerning the basic institutions of decision that we call the constitutive process, reflect an understanding that institutionalizes expectations about the distribution of basic or fundamental power relations
over time.
The term "constitutive process" is preferable to the term "constitutional law" because the stability of understandings or expectations
about the key institutions of power in a community or state are, within
limits, fluid and continuing. The constitutive process does not terminate its decisional, prescriptive or applicative roles simply because
the founding fathers have promulgated a document called "The Constitution." However important a document may be as codification of
expectations about the distribution of power among the key powerbrokers of the time, it cannot reify the conditions of constitutive process, especially the power aspect of constitutive process. Viewed in
this light, a constitution stabilizes expectations about the processes of
effective power, and generates understanding about the allocation of
a kind of decisionmaking competence largely conditioned by expectations about a fundamental law, that is, Constitutional Law. 9 From this
perspective, we see that the constitutive process of the United States
allocates competence about governance at multiple levels of the social

Benthamite utilitarianism betrays a complete lack of familiarity with the literature of the policy
sciences, or a complete misunderstanding of its social science, jurisprudential and normative
basis, as well as its methodological underpinnings.
9. There is a danger in suggesting that constitutional law should be subject to rethinldng
to accommodate civil procedure, because of the concerns some scholars feel that pervade the
"one scholar - at least one theory" syndrome, and the attendant fear that we are being drowned
in egotistical theory-construction. The fields most affected by this are conflict of laws, and
perhaps more visibly, certainly more spectacularly, constitutional law. See Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributionof Special Theories of Judicial Review,

35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983). For a trenchant response to the Van Alstyne thesis, see
Saphire, ConstitutionalTheory in Perspective:A Response to ProfessorVan Alstyne, 78 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1435 (1984).
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and power process. Competence is allocated to the executive branch,
the legislative branch, the courts, the states, individuals, etc. Refining
the precise allocation of competence is a continuing affair, integral to
the idea of a constitutive process.

Civil procedure is an aspect of the constitutive process concerned
primarily with what policy-oriented lawyers call the "applicative" function. 10 The applicative function deals with the allocation of competences
in ways both complex and confusing to the observer and others untrained in law. In the United States, the "rules" of civil procedure
allocate competence to parties who present and prosecute claims before

10. On the applying function, specifically, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN,
supra note 4, at 289-99, as it relates to the international procedure for processing human rights
claims. The application function that includes civil procedure is "[tjhe application of prescriptions
in particular instances." Id. at 290. Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen point out that in
[i]ts most comprehensive form, application may be characterized as including the
following sequential features: the exploration of potential facts, including the precipitating events and their larger factual context; the exploration of potentially
relevant policies; the identification of the facts to be regarded as significant; the
determination of the authoritative policies applicable; the making of the decision,
including the projection of future relations between the parties; enforcement; and
review.
Id. at 289-90.
In addition to the application of prescriptions to particular instances, all other decision
functions "are in a measure fashioned to assist in securing rational, uniform, effective and
constructive applications." Id. at 290. In addition, it is vitally important that the application
function, in conjunction with allied decision functions, secure those applications that in fact "put
basic community policies into controlling practice and mobilize a continuing consensus, in support
of prescription" that augments the delivery of justice and freedom, in short, human dignity. Id.
The demand implicit in the civil procedure background is, in effect, a demand for "performance
of an entire sequence of activities constituting an application .
"Id. at 291. These activities
include the
[e]xploration and characterizaton of facts and the exploration and choice of policies.
The exploration of policies characteristically includes three interlocking subgoals:
the interpretation of prescriptions (seeking the closest possible approximation to
the communications made); supplementation (filling gaps and removing ambiguities),
and integration (the policing and accommodation of prescriptions in terms of
priorities in community demands).
Id. The bases of power in the system of procedure include the management of authority symbols,
as well as the bases of effective power that attend the process of civil litigation. The strategies
available to lawyers in civil litigation are complex and varied, but include both those that are
coercive as well as persuasive. The outcomes of final applications affect patterns of value distribution and future behaviors. The enforcement of judgments may "build upon inducement as
well as coercion," and most significantly, no decision or application is "really final." Id. at 292.
Every application is "an experiment in goal realization which is tested through time and changing
context by the responses of those affected, directly and indirectly." Review is itself a continuing
process. Id.
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the courts. The rules allocate exclusive, sequential, and concurrent
competence to diverse courts within and without the state. In addition,
they allocate competence between judge and jury, trial judge and
appellate judge, and complex burdens of pleading and proof. Civil
procedure is, therefore, more accurately described as civil process,
and is an aspect of constitutive process because the "rules" allocate
decisionmaking competence about basic power arrangements. Although the allocations take place at a low visibility level, these allocations of authoritative decisional competence reflect complex assumptions about the appropriate exercise of control and authority that are
fundamental. They provoke deeper concerns about congruence with
the broader goals of constitutive process, and the extent to which
principles of content and procedure might be used to design a better
guidance mechanism for civil procedure and its power dimensions, to
better approximate the goals of the constitutive process itself, and
the larger goals of the system of public order.
While conventionally descriptive, civil procedure literature does
not adequately disclose a coherent or comprehensive theory about
procedure. The literature is designed to meet the practitioner's needs
and adheres, therefore, to normative standards of law intended to
make the procedural rules work more economically, fairly, and quickly.
While Yale professors Cover and Fiss have managed, along with several others, to stimulate a more informed normative and conceptual
dialogue about the nature of civil procedure, they have failed, on the
whole, to stimulate any radical reassessment of the subject." Although
their published work stresses the relevance of the normative element
of procedure, the subject's ostensible disjunction from constitutive
process makes it difficult to clarify the relevance of the goals of constitutive process to the process of civil procedure.
Two vital considerations exist that the Yale project failed to explicate in clear terms. Although the collaborators implicitly recognized
distinct and discreet procedural values and the influence of these values
over the design and content of other values, they failed to exhaust
the concept of power and its interrelationships with the various aspects
of the procedural process. The second flaw rests in their failure to
bring a manifestly clear jurisprudential focus to the system of civil
procedure. While their book does contain an important article by Professor Simon,12 which analyzes the adversary process and the nature

11.

R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979).

12.

See Simon, supra note 2, at 48.
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of the lawyer's role in terms of contending paradigms of law, it gives
scant guidance about the nature of civil procedure. The book falls
short of providing any deeper appreciation of the role of civil procedure
in the normative scheme of legal process.
III.

CIVIL PROCESS AND POWER: THE CONVENTIONAL
MYTH SYSTEM AND THE OPERATIONAL CODE

To underscore the paucity of realistic theorizing about civil procedure, consider the extent to which operational theories of procedure
obscure the relationship of procedure to the processes of effective
power, and consequently to the constitutive process, of which it is a
part. An adequate appreciation of this problem should help one appreciate the role and potentials of civil procedure as part of the larger
process of authoritative decision we label "law." We should then be
able to provide a better normative basis for appreciating the purpose
of civil procedure and for realizing how those goals might better be
accomplished.
As part of the common law, the system of "civil procedure" predates
the adoption of the United States Constitution. Indeed, it may be that
the common law owes its longevity as a coherent system of law to
civil procedure. Professor Maitland has maintained that the substantive aspect of common law was actually secreted through the interstices of procedure. Maitland also reminds us that although the
classic forms of action have been long buried, they still rule us from
their graves. 13 The legacy of common law modes of procedure has
been substantially revised by subsequent generations of lawyers.
Pleading the specific pigeon-hole of liability, the appropriate "form of
action" has given way to the code system of pleadings, in which the
requirement is that a party plead the relevant "cause of action." The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have gone even further and, under
the influence of functionalist theories of law, given us the procedural
institution of "claims" upon which relief can be granted. The tying of
"claims" to the institutional capability of the court as a dispute-resolving, justice-dispensing institution of government underscores the flexibility and function of the civil litigation process, rather than form and
formulary conditions associated with earlier procedural systems.
But the influence of procedural "form," or more accurately procedural thinking, has imprinted itself deeply on the jurisprudence of
common law thinking as a whole. By civil law standards, common law

13.

See F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1932).
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thinking is still particularistic, skeptical of philosophic abstractions
and casuistic in character. Thus Maitland's insight may still be relevant: although we have buried the formulary system, we have not
buried the casuistic modes of thinking that it represents. Enlarging
upon Maitland in contemporary terms suggests that the procedural
myth is a dominant condition upon the actual behavior of judicial
decisionmakers and lawyers, or a dominant ideological instrument that
rationalizes what lawyers and judges do. But this myth communicates
virtually nothing to those who receive the benefits and burdens of
civil processes; i.e., the clients and outsiders to litigation whose rights
and duties are shaped by this system.
As indicated earlier, one of the outcomes of a community's power
process is the process of decisionmaking, or more precisely for the
purposes of law, the process of authoritative decisionmaking. From
an observer's perspective, what we label civil procedure is simply an
aspect of this larger, more inclusive process. Procedural scholarship
is, however, dominated by its immediate practitioner relevancy. Scholarly work, therefore, is characterized by theories of procedure,
theories that frequently stress the use of the rules in the strategic
roles of lawyers in practice. Literature about procedure, on the other
hand, is notably sparse. Yet I suggest that theories about procedure
fr-om the scientific observer's perspective will give important insights
into some of the thornier problems of civil procedure, such as the
substance-procedure distinction, the relationship of procedure to decisionmaking, and the constitutive process.
To illustrate the value of a theory about civil procedure, a theory
that links civil procedure to the relevant processes of effective power
and constitutional law, a selected range of procedural problems should
be examined. Thus one may better appreciate how unedifying the law
is about the power aspect of civil process, and how much realism
might be brought to civil process, by a simple appreciation of the
power operations of role players operating under the "rules" themselves.
The characterization of the "rules" of civil procedure as power-conditioned may be too obvious a datum even to verbalize. For the scientific observer, the characteristic of procedure most striking, apart
fr-om its social ubiquity, is the power aspect of the rules and institutions
of procedure. For example, whether procedures sanctioning trial by
battle or trial by ordeal were meant to be conditioned by the "invisible
hand" of God or the steel mace of the champion is not as important
to the observer as the coercive dimension of power it represents.
The principle that all actions at law were "local" actions exemplifies
the relationship of procedure to the concepts of status and land, the
twin pillars of feudal power. The emergence of the transitory cause
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of action, a procedural fiction neatly following the interests of expanding mercantilism, is still another example of the interplay of procedural
innovation in the locus of power from status to contract. More recently,
the Supreme Court adverted to the power aspects of in personam
jurisdiction and noted that the summons, the symbolic exercise of
state power by state officials, had replaced the capias ad respondendum, the physical apprehension of the defendant, as the means of
making a defendant answerable in a civil proceeding. The myriad of
procedural instances of the power aspect of procedure might extend
indefinitely.
To illustrate the problem of the relevance of power to theorizing
about civil procedure we examine four general procedural problems:
first, the problems of due process and state court jurisdiction; second,
the problems of massive class actions; third, the problems of substance
and procedure; and fourth, the problem of lawyer roles in the context
of the adversary aspect of civil procedure. Additionally, we attempt
to provide a jurisprudential context for civil procedure, and suggest
the utility of a policy-oriented framework for a better appreciation of
what civil procedure is, and what its normative basis should be.
IV.

STATE COURT JURISDICTION: THE DUE PROCESS MYTH
AND THE OPERATIONS OF EFFECTIVE POWER

Since the Supreme Court decided Pennoyer v. Neff 4 in 1878, the
exercise and reach of state court jurisdictional competence has been
subject to the limitations imposed by constitutional standards of due
process. Theorists have urged that Pennoyer actually imposed a power
theory about the appropriate reach of a state court's jurisdictional
competence, and that one might fruitfully view the law of state court
jurisdiction not as an elaboration of traditional jurisdictional ideas
reified by the due process clause, but rather as a reaction to Pennoyei's
reification of due process concepts.
A review of major decisions does not indicate when the Court
began chipping away at the reified edifice created by Pennoyer. Corporate defendant cases may have caused the change, since the presence
of a corporation in a jurisdiction is manifested by corporate functions,
and the collapsing of corporate functions into the archaic notion of
presence is not easily accomplished without artifice. 15 The change may

14. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
15. For a review of this trend that culminated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), see Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In
PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Dencla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 569, 577-86, (1958).
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have begun with the non-resident automobile cases where the court
recognized that a fictional service of process substitution could bring
a non-resident motorist-defendant within the power of the state courts
''
on the theory that automobiles are "dangerous machines. 16
The major shift from the Pennoyer doctrine, however, is invariably
identified with the Supreme Court decision InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington.1 7 In International Shoe, the Court sought to allocate
greater flexibility to state courts in the exercise of extra-territorial
jurisdictional competence. The Court used the due process clause not
to reify jurisdictional concepts along rigid territorial lines, but to define
the reach of state court process in terms of a "reasonableness" standard. The famous test of reasonable extra-territorial jurisdictional competence was the "minimum contacts" test. The test was further conditioned by "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' s
Some theorists suggest that the law of state court jurisdiction from
Pennoyerto InternationalShoe and beyond represents an evolutionary
progress from power to authority. According to this view, the core
authority signals mandate a minimum standard of fairness, reasonableness, and convenience. The authority myth indicates a process for the
assertion of state court jurisdictional competence conditioned by standards of rationality and justice rather than coercion and power. 9
Students of procedure studying state court jurisdiction early in
their law school years are impressed by the salience of the due process
idea as a means of constraining the arbitrariness that might repose
in assertions of state jurisdictional competence across state and national lines. The overwhelming impression, frequently given by
academicians, suggests that assertions of power over parties and issues
are predominantly influenced by the great edifice of fairness and substantial justice mandated by InternationalShoe and its progeny. The
first year student is often impressed with the great and agonizing
battles to satisfy "fair play and substantial justice" without ever approaching the merits of a case. In addition, the intellectual and material
capital that defines and refines a "minimum contact" may also be
impressive. Perhaps the message conveyed is that no matter how
small the problem, it is never too small for principles of "fair play and
substantial justice."

16. Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
17, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18. Id. at 316.
19. Hazard, General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241. The
traditional distinction between power and authority is indeed fictitious. There is both control
and authority in every lawful exercise of power.
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The above scenario masks important and substantial allocations of
power in the civil process system quite far from the high ideals of
constitutional due process. Perhaps one of the most statistically relevant areas of civil process that tracks the law of Pennoyer and International Shoe is the nature and quantum of due process delivered by
the bill collector.20 Countrymen described the system of debt collection
as a system of "grab law," a system governed by the principle that
he who grabs last grabs least. The procedural remedies available to
the bill collector have historically included the writ of attachment, the
writ of garnishment, the writ of replevin, the use of cognovit notes,
and the self-help and self-sale provisions of sections 9-503 and 9-504
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 21 Historically, the Supreme Court
has only recently been willing to apply concepts of procedural due
process to some of these procedural devices.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 the Supreme Court struck
down a Wisconsin wage-garnishment law because the garnished wages,
which the Court recognized as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system," required a special measure of due process protection. 2 The Sniadach Court held that freezing
of wages "absent notice and a prior hearing ...

violates fundamental

principles of due process."- Summary procedure flies in the face of
the great jurisdictional principles limiting the exercise of state jurisdictional power over defendants. The key test of summary procedures
that occurred in the context of wage garnishment rather than some
lesser kind of interest may have resulted from an accident of litigation.
Indeed, Justice Douglas suggested that beyond the context of wage
garnishment, summary process might still be licit in the cause of
creditor needs.25

20. See Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 521
(1973); cf. also Swygert, Consumer Protection, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 98 (1973) (survey of legal
developments affecting rights and obligations of consumers).
21. U.C.C. § 9-503. Unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without a breach of the peace or may proceed by action." Id. Section
9-504 permits the secured party to sell the collateral and apply the proceeds to the debtor's
outstanding indebtedness provided the sale or foreclosure is done in a commercially reasonable
manner. See id. § 9-504.
22. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
23. Id. at 340.

24. Id. at 342.
25. Id. at 339. Justice Douglas says, for example, that such "summary procedure may well
meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations." Id. But in Sniadach, no
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Sniadach affected other creditors' remedies as well. First, lower
courts declared several garnishment statutes unconstitutional. Second,
the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania were held inconsistent with constitutional due process standards. Third, attachment statutes were successfully challenged for constitutional sufficiency. Two
remedies did, however, escape the expanding reach of Sniadach. The
confession of judgment procedures and the self-help provisions of
U.C.C. sections 9-503 and 9-504 may be seen as the vanishing point
of due process concepts in the context of civil litigation.
In Swarb v. Lennox, 26 the United States Supreme Court held that
a confession of judgment provision in a contract, consistent with a
Pennsylvania rule permitting the confession of judgments, was facially
valid. The Court, however, affirmed a lower court judgment declaring
the statute invalid as applied to natural persons who earn less than
$10,000.27

A confession of judgment proceeding creates the fiction of judicial
supervision and control. Since judgment is "confessed," nothing is left
to argue about before the court. Since the merits have been decided
by contract, nothing specifically requires meaningful notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Even more pertinent are provisions that
totally exclude courts from confessing judgments in standard form
contracts. Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the U.C.C. permit the creditor
to attach the secured good by a process of self-help without breach
of the peace, and authorize the sale of the secured good in a "commercially reasonable manner." These provisions have withstood constitutional challenges on the fictional basis that statutes empowering creditors to practice self-help techniques represent only passive rather
than active state action, and thus represent no state action subject to
the limitations of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2
The amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of creditor special interest
groups contended that self-help was quick and cheap, and thus signifi-

situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest was presented by the facts;
nor was the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to any such unusual condition. Petitioner was
a resident of the Wisconsin community and in personamjurisdiction was readily obtainable. Id.
26. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
27. Id.

28. A lower court decision, Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), did find
state action in the sense that the state "encouraged" self-help. Id. at 617. In Kirksey v. Theilig,
351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972), the court found no state action since forms of self-help were
recognized at common law. Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va.
1972), found only passive state action. This latter rationale seems to have won the day.
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cantly reduced the cost of consumer credit. 29 In short, self-help aids
the consumer in the long haul. Under this analysis, consumer needs
are presumably collapsed into the creditor needs adverted to by Justice
Douglas.
The great myth system of due process of law in civil litigation,
anchored around Pennoyer, InternationalShoe, Mullane, Worldwide
Volkswagen, Shaeffer and other significant cases is cognizable. Yet
the operational dynamics of one of the most significant aspects of civil
litigation conflict is an operational code informed by the principle of
"grab law" - a principle sustained by the dynamics of statesanctioned, private power. In defense of the jurisdictional myth-system, however, the grand "authority" edifice has a significant effect
on the battle against unemployment - at least for lawyers!
V.

CLASS JUSTICE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: CLASS ACTIONS

Situation two involves another example of the interplay between
the myth system of procedural standards and the operational code.
The perennial problem of clogged court dockets and trial delays is one
of the great and persistent concerns of those with an interest in the
administration of justice. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been
an ardent spokesman for the proposition that the solution to the problems of judicial administration is to have fewer cases, and that at
least in the federal context, this can be achieved by rules limiting
access to federal courts. 30 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evidence a modest effort to accomplish the goals of efficiency and accessibility to justice through the evolution and development of class action
suits. Until recently at least, Rule 23(b)(3) could be viewed as a procedural instrument for delivering class justice on a class scale.
The Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to develop Rule
23(b)(3) in a manner enabling it to be a major instrument of consumer
protection as well as an instrument responsive to mass justice on a
large scale. The idea of courts dispensing mass justice on a mass scale
would not take favorable root in a predominantly agrarian and
ruralized body politic. This idea responds to the challenges occasioned
by the mass production of goods and services covering huge aggregates
of affected people. The question, of course, is whether a court system
shaped fundamentally along individuated lines can be molded and

29. See Swygert, Consumer Protection, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 98 (1973).
30. Address by Justice William H. Rehnquist at University of Florida College of Law (Sept.
15, 1984) (available on videocassette in University of Florida Law Library).
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shaped to meet the problems of mass society and mass culture. Rule
23(b)(3) seemed to be a mild experiment in this direction, and for a
time it generated the myth that the class action suit was an instrument
for redressing the balance of power among capital, industry, big labor
and the consumer. The capacity to resolve untold numbers of legal
claims in a single proceeding suggests potential for expedition and
efficiency in the administration of justice.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,31 the Supreme Court was confi-onted with a colossal class action suit. A major New York brokerage
firm had overcharged the transaction costs of odd lots sold on the
stock exchange. The manageability of the class action required judicial
supplementation of Rule 23(b)(3). The central question before the
Court was whether the supplemental remedy, invented by the lower
courts to give practical effect to the rule, was an appropriate interpretation and application of the rule. The Supreme Court focused instead
on what the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the litigants considered a secondary issue: Had the plaintiff class members been given
the appropriate measure of due process notification under the jurisdictional rules announced in Mullane? Since threshold notice had not
been given, the Court dismissed the action.
Perhaps the Mullane rule is an essential foundation of a legal
system that sees as a major purpose the allocation of rights and duties
on the basis of personal and individuated identity. And perhaps an
essential element of the adversary process is that lawyers represent
clients who are "autonomous egos." The idea of autonomy may be a
reasonable assumption upon which to allocate legal rights and duties,
but the myth of nineteenth century individualism may symbolize a
golden age that never really was and that is incompatible with urban
culture, standardization, and mass society that appear to overwhelm
the individual ego. The concept of autonomous man - then and now
- may, however, be a desirable legal myth. Perhaps then, Eisen stands
like Don Quixote - something admirable, part of a mythical age of
chivalry - indeed a reification of the nineteenth century myth of
individualism in its insistence that class justice process meet standards
of individualism, whatever the cost to the delivery of class justice on
a class scale. When Justice Rehnquist was asked to explain Eisen in
light of his commitment to less litigation and faster court procedures,
he simply stated that it was "evident that you disagree with the Eisen
holding. Well, a majority of the Court agrees with it ....,,32

31. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
32. J. Rehnquist, Remarks at Faculty Seminar, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
(Sept. 15, 1984).
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I suggest that here too we see the emergence of a myth system
about the responsiveness of the courts within the civil procedure system. Pursuant to the principles of fair play and substantial justice,
plaintiffs in a representative suit had to receive a level of notification
that effectively aborted the case itself. Perhaps the idea that control
over massive amounts of capital generated by such litigation in the
hands of consumer advocates was seen as incompatible with a responsible process for that control. The influence of institutional capital on
the processes of authoritative decisionmaking, therefore, is seemingly
more decisive when we deal with class justice and consumer protection,
although the justification the Eisen Court gave elevated individualism
and the due process myth to great heights.
VI.

THE PERENNIAL PROBLEMS OF
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

The conventional myth about the relationship between substance
and procedure is that the latter is adjectival, since it exists for something else. The relationship has been more colorfully expressed as
procedure being the "handmaiden" of substantive law, Maitland notwithstanding. The ultimate example of using the procedural myth
system to trump a substantive claim lies in the judgment of Justice
Marshall in the celebrated case, Marbury v. Madison.3 In that case,
Justice Marshall asked whether the petitioner had a "right to the
commission" and further "whether the laws of his country afforded
him a remedy." As it turned out, the mandamus remedy existed, but
could not issue from the Supreme Court. The spirit of Marbury is
clearly illustrated in the Supreme Court's recent rebuff to Congress
in the litigation involving the Gramm-Rudman bill. In a phrase that
captures the power of the procedural myth as it "proceduralizes" our
political life, the Court said the purpose of separating and dividing
powers of government was to diffuse power so as to better serve
liberty.
Procedural rules are described as representative of the techniques
used by parties and decisionmakers to arrive at judicial decisions.
Emphasis is not on substantive law and its content, but on the means
by which substantive ends are attained. To distinguish procedural
means from the substantive ends does not mean that we can divorce
the interdependence of means and ends. Each concept is shaped by

33.
34.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Bowsher v. Syner, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986).
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the demands of justice or, indeed, the lack thereof. The recurrent
tension in the practice of law lying within the substance/procedure
distinction is posed simply in the following manner: Why should an
otherwise meritorious claim be dismissed because of a procedural infraction, often termed a "mere technicality"? Obviously the term
"mere" is loaded, for it suggests that fidelity to procedural standards
is less important than securing substantive results. But even substantive results might be "infected" and therefore lead to a miscarriage
of justice. Some persons would like to de-elevate procedural norms
and focus on the "goodness" or "badness" of the result. Others see
within the interstices of procedure the principle of legality, without
which we have no principled, impartial, and otherwise fair rule of law.
Some suggest that social institutions for dispute management can provide at best, not somebody's subjective idea of substantive justice,
but rather the fairest and most equitable mode of proceeding. In other
words, so long as we have assured a party his "procedural due process," no more can be expected. Sometimes these ideas are discussed
in constitutional adjudication as representing "neutral principles" and
those who subscribe to these neutral principles oppose those who are
more result-oriented.
The myth that ideal procedural rules are neutral as to substantive
ends is an appealing instance of what Shklar calls the ideology of
"legalism." The isolation of procedure from substantive expectations
is simply an instance of a value system that serves to "isolate law
completely from the social context within which it exists."''
While the relationship of substance to procedure is in practice a
pervasive and difficult problem in many fields of law, courts and
theorists have recognized that in particular situations a core interdependence exists between substantive and procedural law. From an
observer's perspective, there seems to be the added recognition that
procedure and substance are empirically grounded instances of more
inclusive decisional functions of application and prescription. The substance-procedure problem is not only one of practical importance to
practitioners and judges, but an important aspect of the nature of law
itself, of continuing importance to those who subscribe to theorizing
"of' as well as "about" law. The myth that procedure is the servant
of substantive justice is an excellent mask for the operative code that
makes power a central ingredient in law. Extending the myth into
the domain of "neutral" principles presents a grander myth that power

35.

J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 2 (1964).
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is a neutral dimension of law, and that winning and losing is immaterial,
from an observer's perspective, to how the game is played.
From an observer's perspective, the relationship between substance and procedure exemplifies the relationship between the constitutive process and the public order. In this view, whether one
classifies a prescripton as procedural or substantive depends on the
purpose for which the question is asked, and the predicted consequences of a decision actually characterizing the prescription. If characterizing a prescription as substantive is more congruent with the common interest, then the policy-oriented jurist will advocate classification
as substantive. If, however, characterization as procedural advances
the common interest, then characterize prescriptions as procedural.
Thus, the test is made with reference to both policy and context.
Justice Frankfurter was partially correct in this advocacy of an
outcome determinative test for Erie problems2 6 A policy-oriented
jurist would differ, however, about what the appropriate "outcome"
should be as a condition of decision. Frankfurter's test was formulated
in a context where his test served to close access to the federal courts
without regard to whether in the instant case the test was congruent
with the common interest. This test was mechanical, it proved too
much, and was soon replaced by a balancing test. The test balanced
complex procedural and constitutive goals against the substantive
claims of the parties, and assumed a decision that preserved decisional
integrity and concern for the substantive values at stake. In effect,
the procedural and constitutive preferred policies were interpreted in
accord with public order goals to secure the common interest in providing a federal forum for some state claims. s7

36. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
37. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), Justice Frankfurter noted that the
terms "substance" and 'procedure" were key-words to "very different problems." To give these
terms meaning in Erie contexts, he formulated a result-oriented policy-informed test: As applied
to a given federal state jurisdictional problem, was the application of the word outcome determinative? This focus became too mechanical in practice since the focus was too result-oriented
and less context-conditioned. The pendulum was rectified in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958), where a contextual balancing test was inserted, a test that found favor
with Justice Harlan in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Perhaps the most illuminating discussions of the distinction emerged in the context of conflict
of laws. Reacting to the idea that all licit applications of the distinction could be formulated as
hard and fast rules, Realist-scholars gave thought and effort to a rethinking of the problem.
Walter Wheeler Cook was among the earliest of Realist theorists to recognize part of the
problem of giving a rational, legal meaning to the substance-procedure distinction. According
to Cook, the meaning of the words themselves, in legal communication, is a purely verbal affair
containing an assumption that legal words have a linear quality whose meaning is intrinsic to
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VII. CHAMPIONING CLIENT AUTONOMY (THE MYTH) V.
SUBVERTING CLIENT AUTONOMY (THE OPERATIVE CODE)

The nature of the adversary process is one of the pillars of our
civil procedure system. The lawyer in an adversary procedural context,
rather than being a "champion," a "parabureaucrat," or an "acolyte,"
as some charge, is really a "special purpose friend"ss to the client. A
legacy of our age of anxiety 39 may be that if we are honest, we are
not sure who the lawyers are because we are not all that certain there
is a consensus about what they do. Although a rich literature attempts
either to describe or justify what people think lawyers do, still a
powerful myth exists that rationalizes the lawyer role in terms of
client autonomy, and further rationalizes client autonomy and the role

the words themselves. Cook challenged the idea that the elucidation of meaning is a matter to
be garnered purely from logical derivation, rather than from the variable conditions of context.
Cook hinted strongly that the meaning of these particular words - substance and procedure
- in judicially defined discourse was in effect drawn from circumstances of practical convenience
as informed by salient policy considerations. Practical convenience in Cook's lexicon was effectually a synonym for underlying the relevance of context. See W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAV 154, 166 (1942). Professor Morgan, writing shortly
after Cook, emerged with conclusions close to those of Cook. Morgan concluded that the meaning
of substance-procedure in decisional contexts was in reality informed by considerations of public
policy and "weighty" practical considerations. See Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58
HARV. L. REV. 153, 195 (1944). Since neither Cook nor Morgan nor any of the Realists were
systematic about the general characteristics of decision or decision functions, the precise relationship of substance and procedure to the general processes of decision, and particularly to legal
decisionmaking, remained elusive. The relevance of context and policy, however, seems apparent
in Cook and Morgan.
In this article I urge that substance and procedure really underscore the relationship between
the constitutive process and the public order. As mapped onto a functional analysis of decisionmaking, substance and procedure would influence all decision functions, especially the functions
of prescription and application. The processes of prescription and application themselves have
an inner anatomy of relatively discrete processes. See W. Reisman, InternationalLawmaking:
A Process of Conr unication, in PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 101 (1981). Even more significant is the possibility that a careful, functional integration
of these decision processes may suggest clearer policy lines for the core perennial problem of
all law: the grounding of value judgments to instances of particular application. Here the invention
of principles of context and procedure add a distinctive dimension to the relationship of substance
and procedure to policy considerations; i.e., to an enhanced framework of practical rationality
in actual decisional arenas.
38. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral F undations of the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); see also Simon, supra note 2, at 72-74 (Simon's discussion of
Fried).
39. On the "age of anxiety" see Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84
YALE L.J. 1022 (1975).
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of lawyers as champions in the assertion of client interests in a democratic society. The following description sets out the nature of the
adversary process in those terms. But the reader should be aware
that trenchant critiques of this model suggest that the nature of the
lawyer as champion operationally subverts the client's autonomy.
VIII.

THE ADVERSARIAL ASPECT OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Our civil procedure system is adversarial. We describe it as adversarial because the claimants carry the main burden of claim presentation and prosecution and because we assume that the judge plays
something of a passive role. Other judicial models exist, of course,
for the management of legal decision; one of these is the "inquisitorial"
model. Such a model assumes the judge is the inquisitor, with the
parties playing an essentially passive role in presentation and prosecution.
The adversary model requires focus on the role and character of
the claim presentors and the claim prosecutors, namely the lawyers
themselves. The lawyer in our system is charged with the role of
making the strongest and most efficient representation of the client's
interests. The client relies on the lawyer; his trust reposes in his
"champion." The lawyer must, however, ultimately rely on himself to
make a strong and efficient showing on behalf of the client.
The adversary process, as it is supposed to work in the United
States today, is consistent with prevailing and widely accepted beliefs
about autonomy, liberty, self-interest, and equality in a democratic,
republican, social, and political process. This is so because the individual and/or his lawyer make the critical decisions about the law suit.
The client and attorney initially decide whether to bring a law suit,
and thereafter how to (1) prosecute the law suit; (2) conduct investigation and research about the relevant facts and law; (3) determine
the strategies relating to trial advocacy; (4) determine the reliance to
be placed on trial and judgment; and (5) determine the strategies for
securing appellate court supervision over the trial court's determinations. As can be seen, the individual attorney determines the nature
and timing of the coercive or persuasive strategies crucial to the presentation of the law suit. In the role of advocate, an attorney will
make many decisions as to whether to proceed, and if so, upon what
power base and employing which strategies.
What about the judge? What is his role? The terms "judge" and
"court" are sometimes interchangeable. Writers say the "court ruled
• . ." when they mean "the judge has ruled .... " The idea of a court
is almost as complex as the idea of a judge. When we refer to the
court, however, we may be referring to a judge or a number of judges

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/13

22

Nagan: Civil Process and Power: Thoughts from a Policy-Oriented Perspect
CIVIL PROCESS AND POWER

presiding in the institution of the court; we may be referring to trial
or appellate tribunals and personnel; we may be referring to a judge
and jury; or we may be referring to all the relevant parties, including
the attorneys and claimants.
The key party in the adjudicatory role, as distinct from the advocate's role, is the judge. The question we are now concerned with is
this: What generally in our adversary process does the role of the
judge amount to? Is his role merely that of an umpire between competing wills, or is the role a more active one? And, because we often
have an authority of lay persons (jurors) active in the decisionmaking
process of the courts, a further question is suggested: What effect
does the institution of the jury have in defining the role of a judge?
Decisionmaking roles and the critical indices that define them in law
are crucial in predicting and understanding judicial behavior. Additionally, principles of procedure are often an important index of the character and scope of such role allocation.
In our adversary process, the "essential" as well as the "ascribed"
identities of all the involved parties, and the indices or "conditions"
that define them, are central to any comprehensive and realistic understanding of the legal process and the role of procedural justice.
The twin pillars of the adversary process, as we have already
suggested, are grounded in the role of the advocate. That role encompasses two fundamental expectations about representing a client.
First, the attorney is charged with presentingthe parties' claim. Second, the attorney is charged with prosecuting that claim through the
phases of a law suit. These ideas complement each other. By "party
presentation" we refer to a claim through the phases of a law suit.
We mean that a claim is clarified through the phases of a law suit,
with reference to principles of content necessary to support the substantiality of the claim. Thus, relevant principles of content will provide an institutional framework whereby an attorney might investigate
the factual basis of a claim, have an opportunity to prove the existence
of relevant facts, and have an opportunity to argue disputed points
of fact or law.
The conceptual basis of party presentation is rooted principally in
our ideas about individual liberty and autonomy. We assume that the
individual is, in the last analysis, the most effective asserter of his
own self-interest. Hence, a party should have, or be allocated, the
power and competence to assert what that party perceives to be his
self-interest. A party, therefore, should determine whether to press
or waive those interests. Additionally, the common interest of the
larger aggregate body politic is enhanced by the expectation that an
individual's rights will be pursued to the extent of that person's perceived self-interest. This principle operates for the government as well
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as the private citizen or private association in the process of party
presentation in the courts. This form of "interest articulation," however, would only be possible where a strongly instituted system of
party presentors exists, namely, an organized Bar historically specialized to the representation and articulation of this "form" of interest
assertion.
Party "prosecution" refers to the initiatives that the parties may
use to move the case toward ultimate resolution on the merits. This
involves all the complex phases of a lawsuit including pre-trial, trial,
post-trial, and appeal. The expedition and efficiency with which a case
may proceed has historically been a function of what the parties do
to each other along the path to final judgment and appeal.
Presentation and prosecution are, of course, complementary concepts. Their complex interplay ideally should reflect a balance between
the parties and principles of procedure that are designed to secure
the integrity of substantive ends. Principles of content and procedure
represent complex but crucial guides to decision. What is important
at this point, however, is that the presentation and prosecution of a
party's claim is done by the party, not by the court. The court is
some sort of institutional umpire or arbiter between the competing
wills of the parties. The outcome of this process of bilateral interest
assertion assumedly will be more accurate, fair, and acceptable and,
therefore, will ensure a greater production and distribution of substantive justice to the parties and community by securing the liberties of
persons and their interests.
Our adversary process is essentially a model whereby particular
interests, or claims, are asserted. Interests are structurally articulated
in a bilateral mode of claim-answer, claim-counterclaim, claim-crossclaim, etc. The authority component of the decisionmaking outcome
of such a process is enhanced when the impartiality of judge and/or
juror is not only a datum, but is perceived to be so. Not only is the
reality of impartiality crucial to the authority of any particular decisional result, but the perception of impartiality is often thought to be
of key symbolic importance. Indeed, a venerable maxim of western
legal culture holds that no judge should adjudicate matters in which
the judge is an interested party.
The above description is perhaps an idealized version of the adversary process and its assumptions. In reality, the role of the advocates
and the judge is much more complex and varied. For example, judges
in the Anglo-American tradition jealously guard their independence
from executive or legislative interference over matters deemed to be
essentially judicial. An independent judiciary is often thought to be
an essential precondition of a political culture that honors individual
freedom. Anglo-American judges often pride themselves in the fact
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that the Supreme Court follows the court of public opinion - that
they are a different breed of judicial decisionmaker from those judges
whose social and political process accords only minimal deference, if
any, to the independence of the courts. From the vantage point of
independent judges, it is seemingly incongruous to find that our ideal
model of the adversary process would ascribe to high-status independent officials a passive role-structure. In fact, common-law judges tend
to be more involved in the administration of a law suit than the ideal
model would have us believe. Moreover, the growth and acceptance
of modern administrative technologies have given judges a further
justification for playing a more active role in the management of contemporary judicial process. In short, the judicial role today has a
distinctively administrative side.
This idealized version of the adversary process, the true handmaiden of civil procedure, greatly oversimplifies the business of client
representation, client autonomy, and client interests. Placing these
relationships into a more realistic context of social dynamics in which
the respective power relations of the parties are more clearly perceived
might produce a less flattering picture of the adversary process and
of lawyer roles within it. Indeed, among the most trenchant criticisms
made of the role of lawyer as champion in the "war against all" is the
psychological vulnerability upon which the model has been erected.40
In short, the institutional context of lawyer and client frequently underscores the lack of autonomy or choice in the client. Moreover, the
institutional context itself establishes structures that assure, in a very
large number of situations, that the lawyer subverts the client's autonomy. Here again, the relationship between the myth system and
the operational code that defines more realistically the power dynamics
of lawyer, client, judge and perhaps jury, underscores the importance
of the observers perspective about procedure and the saliency of power
in the application process.

IX.

JURISPRUDENCE, POWER AND RATIONALITY

These examples illustrate the role the myth system plays in obscuring the operations of procedure in the process of decisionmaking. This
recognition has led to diverse jurisprudential theorists viewing procedural prescriptions in terms that make clear their affinity to the
processes of effective power. Let us consider two jurisprudential per-

40.

See Simon, surra note 2, at 57-60.
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spectives by reference to schools of legal thought representing views
that are fundamentally polarized.
The first view is that of Professor H.L.A. Hart. 41 Within Professor
Hart's paradigm, law is a union of primary and secondary rules, and
rules are conceptual devices very largely insulated from the world of
cause and effect. Under Hart's scheme, the primary rules, encumbered
by the defects of inefficiency, uncertainty, and static quality, are supplemented by another species of rules, secondary rules, which perform
power functions in what Hart would view as a formal sense. These
secondary rules prescribe the ways in which the primary rules may
be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied or violated.
In a broad sense, the secondary rules to which Hart avers are rules
concerned with some dimension of power. Without such rules the
rights, duties, and claims of the disputing parties are commingled into
diluted and amorphous pleas and relegated towards ineffective channels of self-help or simple contemplations of what might have been.
Hart's secondary rules of adjudication, in effect, tell us what judges
are, what lawyers are, what courts are, what jurisdiction is, what
judgments are, and so on. Yet under Hart's scheme, rules that empower private lawmaking are not necessarily procedural, although
from the observer's perspective, one could conceivably maintain that
substantive law rules that define the modes of private lawmaking are
best classified as procedural. I do not propose to get into a complex
critique of the interplay and classifications Hart uses within his
scheme. For our purposes, I will focus on a single procedural aspect
of Professor Hart's work: his secondary rules, which are fundamentally
rules of power. Since Hart ignores fact, he views the concept of power
as a concept of formal power, which in the sense employed by Wesley
Newcombe Hohfeld, is one element included in the concept of a legal
right. Whether we define the nature of procedure in broad or in
narrow terms, therefore, the concept of power under the most formalistic of jurisprudential schemes is what makes law certain, flexible
and efficient.
The second jurisprudential law view is that of Professors McDougal,
Lasswell and Reisman. They are, of course, the architects of the
jurisprudence of the policy sciences. In the McDougal scheme, law is
a process of decision, or more precisely, authoritative decision. Since
authoritative and controlling decision is a fact, we may rightly view
the McDougal system as the antithesis of the Hartian scheme. Under

41.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961).
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McDougal's policy orientation, law is a process of decisionmaking that
is both authoritative and controlling, where members of the community
clarify and implement their common interests.42 Furthermore,
McDougal and Lasswell insist that the perspective of the authoritative
decisionmaker is quite distinct from the perspective of the observer
or claimant. They also point out that jurisprudential ideas are often
present in the daily decisionmaking of judges, advocates, administrators, and legislators.
McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman insist, as strongly as Hart denies,
that jurisprudence is most usefully conceived as a theory about law
and not a theory of law. As a theory about law, they have insisted
that one of the central intellectual tasks of jurisprudence involves the
capacity to view the phenomenon of law through the lens of an observer. Such an undertaking is guided by the use of several intellectual
tasks designed to provide a comprehensive, particular, and relevant
jurisprudential orientation. One of the major contributions of the jurisprudence of the policy sciences is its focus on law as authoritative
decision, and its efforts to locate decisionmaking in the contextual
framework of the larger community process. The focal points of my
article, therefore, are two: first, what is the anatomy of decisionmaking; and second, how does procedure fit into this anatomy?
According to McDougal, decisionmaking that aspires to even the
most minimal measure of rationality necessarily encompasses seven
decision functions: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation,
application, termination, and appraisal. Although defined in general
categories, these functions can be found in all but the most unreasonable of procedural systems. In addition, McDougal's model requires
that from a jurisprudential point of view, the decisionmaking process
itself and the values to which it subscribes be assessed against principles of content and principles of procedure to enable the decisionmaking process to integrate procedural values with substantive ones.
Moreover, McDougal requires that the entire decisionmaking process
also be assessed for its contribution to knowledge, its conformity with
its own stated goals, and its congruence with the broader goals to
which the observer is committed.
As can be easily inferred, decisionmaking is an outcome of the
power process, and all decision functions have both a procedural and

42. For a general orientation to the jurisprudence of the policy sciences, see M. McDoUGAL,
H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 289; Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence in
Policy-Or!nted Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 486 (1966-1967).
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a substantive dimension in policy oriented terms, a constitutive (which
includes procedure) and a public order (substantive human rights
values) dimension. Within a jurisprudential framework that views law
as fact, therefore, the relationship between procedural and substantive
law is one that can only be appreciated in terms of the power background, in terms of the functions of decisionmaking, and in terms of
the approximation of those forms of decisionmaking to the principles
of content and procedure that guide the grounding of value judgments.
These jurisprudential views represent the idea of law in conceptual
terms and in empirical terms. Yet in the positivist lexicon, procedural
rules are a species of secondary or power-conferring rules. In the
policy-oriented perspective, procedure interfaces with all decision-functions and might better be seen in terms of a general taxonomy of the
entire process of application, which is, of course, only one aspect of
decisionmaking.
X.

PROCEDURE AND THE POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE

The examples used to illustrate the interplay between the mythsystem and the operational code suggest that the law of procedure or
civil procedure is a complex, but crucial variable in the processes we
label, for convenience, "judge-made law." Like law generally, civil
procedure is characterized by a myth system that implies stability,
and an operational code that stimulates new applicative competences,
terminates old ones and confirms or expands the reach of existing
ones. The operational code may be seen as the dynamic side of law
- the living law. The application function of decision may decisively
influence or condition how other decision functions are executed. The
major purpose for which the community provides an application function within its constitutive process is to clarify and put its fundamental
policies into controlling practice. This requires a very careful exploration of the potentially relevant facts and the determination of what
facts will be regarded as relevant. It also requires an exploration of
potentially relevant policies and a choice of what policies are appropriate for the particular instance of application. Finally, it requires the
relation of the chosen policies to the facts regarded as relevant. The
traditional assumptions that procedure and substance are autonomous
decision functions seems untenable if we appreciate how prescription
and application interstimulate and interdetermine the outcomes of decision. These conclusions may then be fruitfully contrasted with the
well received idea that civil procedure is adjectival, that it exists for
something else; namely, to vindicate substantive justice. Upon reflection, however, this seems like putting the proverbial cart before the
horse. Under Hart's system we apparently have no efficacy, certainty
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or flexibility without those secondary rules of power. For a decision
to qualify as law under McDougal's policy-oriented system, it must be
both authoritative and controlling. In other words, power must be the
crucial ingredient in the process of decisionmaking and thus an integral
part of procedure. Anglo-American lawyers have long indulged the
colorful myth that somehow or other, if content and process are different, content trumps process or, in a very real sense, procedure is
only supposed to "facilitate" decisions of substance.
The procedural expectations codified by the rules of procedure
promote discrete decision functions within the institutions of civil process. The critical question to an observer is whether the procedure
promotes anything to do with "rationality, '43 and what might be done
to enable the procedural aspect of decision to improve the rationality
of the decision process we call law. If by rationality we mean an
optimal decision process (the means) that consciously and efficaciously
promotes articulated goals and values (the ends), then the larger values
of the public order require clarification.
The problem of whether law has anything to do with values is a
major jurisprudential controversy in conventional theoretical literature. Policy-oriented jurisprudence views as absurd the idea of law
as autonomous from human values. From the policy perspective, however, questions as to how we get these values and how we clarify
them for the purposes of decision in law have been discussed elsewhere. Suffice it to say that the observer cannot escape the value
issue if he is concerned about making rational decisions. The general
value the policy-oriented jurisprudence attributes to an observer is
that, conveniently styled, the public order of human dignity.- In this
view, discrete procedural values do not stand apart, for the purpose
of appraisal, from the larger value commitments that the observer
recommends. If this perspective is accepted, the critical question becomes how to shape law to more consciously approximate the principles
and policies associated with human rights, and how decisional princi45
ples of procedure and content might be constructed to meet this goal.

43.

Rationality in the perspective of the policy-oriented jurisprudence is best approximated

by the use of the five intellectual tasks: Goal, Trend and Condition, Appraisal, Projection, and
Alternatives. The form of thinking required to maximally utilize these intellectual tools is called
configurative thinking. See Nagan, Human Rights and World Public Order, (Book Review), 2
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & ComP. LAW 106, n.26 (1980).
44. See Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISUAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 1 (1981).

45. Philosopher David Little has understood the importance of identifying the grounds of
value clarification, and has provided an insightful critique of the principles of content and
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The second major component of the notion of rationality is the
concern with "means" in the broadest sense of the term. The term
"means" encapsulates a large range of jurisprudential ideas, the most
important being the processes of effective power.
Within the framework of at least two major schools of jurisprudence
is acceptance of the idea that procedure is an important instrument
of power. Power is an outcome of social process. Rules or prescriptions
that define power competences are, in reality, codified expectations
that guide decisionmakers in making choices about the competency
and reach of fundamental institutions of decisionmaking. Procedure
has an affinity, then, to the social process context of which it is an
outcome, more specifically, of the power aspect of social process. Thus
if we ever attempted to provide a conceptual framework for civil
procedure from the perspective of an observer, rather than the practitioner, it would be that the rules of civil procedure are codified but
incomplete, ambiguous, and sometimes logically circular expectations
about the allocation of public power to both public and private actors
who function primarily through the institution of the courts. The definition of a court would have to be broad enough to include what
lawyers do in and out of their offices and chambers. By strategic
manipulation of these general guidelines, however, diverse actors such
as claimants, lawyers, judges, and a whole range of others, can wield
state-sanctioned power within the court system to produce good or
bad results. This vantage point suggests that quite possibly we need
to refocus our inquiry into the nature of civil procedure. Such a refocusing might be along the following lines, which we regard as more
vigorously empirical in the process-oriented sense of the term.
-

-

For whom are the rules of procedure prescribed?
How are procedural rules made and applied?
What procedural values and larger legal and societal values are meant to be advanced by the procedural regime?
Who prescribes the rules of procedure?
What is the content of the rules so prescribed and what
do they do?

If the rules are basically power rules, then much of the nature of
civil procedure is linked to constitutional law prescriptions. The funda-

procedure here recommended to promote a civil procedure that maximizes the potentials for
"rational" applications in the common interest. See Little, Toward Clarifying the Grounzds of
Value - Clarification: A Reaction to the Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and
McDougal, 14 VA. J. INFL LAW 451 (1974).
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mental characteristic of constitutional prescriptions is that they codify
expectations about the allocation of power at many important levels
of decisionmaking. Civil procedure shares with constitutional law the
idea that the rules allocate power, although the allocation in civil
procedure is more institution specific. Not all rules of civil procedure
carry a kind of constitutional imprimatur. Although the due process
clause has been widely interpreted in civil litigation, not every procedural rule has been elevated to constitutional status under either
due process or some other constitutional standard.
Some of the procedural rules do carry a direct constitutional imprimatur, and others that have not been so interpreted certainly may
be appraised to the extent they vindicate the values of constitutional
reasonableness and fairness. Perhaps an accurate description of our
civil procedure system is that it maintains a low visibility aspect of
constitutional law in the broad sense that the values of fairness, equality, and reasonableness are at least assumed to undergird the diverse
and complex rules. The function of these rules is the establishment
and maintenance of a process where functionally legal and judicial
decisions are made and applied. The rules hone out the allocation of
power to private parties - lay persons, judges, lawyers, professional
associations, legislatures, and executive authorities. Optimally then,
the rules of civil procedure aspire to "rationality," allocating competences in the effective use of state power to resolve disputes and
advance public policy through the court process. An entire set of
further questions arises that again focuses on the empirical character
of civil process.
-

-

-

-

Who makes the effective recommendation about the content and structure of the procedural rules and upon
what information? How is the data amassed and by
what procedures?
Who may procedurally be authorized to invoke the application of substantive law, to which other parties, and
in what contexts?
What policies are promoted by the application of substantive law, and what is its promotional impact on long
run efficacy of the process?
What policies are promoted by the use of procedural norms
in the application of both procedural and substantive
prescription to particular cases, and what is the promotional impact upon the institutional process of dispute
management and claim presentation or prosecution?

Procedural rules in the United States, for example, allocate a great
deal of power to private parties invoking state power in order to
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compel other parties to settle their differences with them. The discovery rules permit a process of private investigation unheard of in most
other parts of the world. The rules prescribe power dispensations
between state and federal courts, trial and appellate courts, judges
and jurors. They allocate burdens and responsibilities, costs and options, and establish the grounds for jurisdiction over parties and over
subject matter. And perhaps most telling of all is that frequently
private parties may, through the civil court system, indulge in a form
of public law enforcement, as is the case with antitrust treble damages.
A vast amount of the interaction between various actors in a civil
litigation, especially within the fact-finding proceeding, is done with
only residual judicial supervision. A very large segment of what a
court is, is found in the offices and chambers of lawyers.
I now return briefly to the normative component of civil procedure.
This problem, I believe, is tied intimately from an operational perspective with the traditional problem of distinguishing substance from
procedure. 46 A large number of civil procedure scholars sometimes
create the impression that the key problem with the distinction is that
of defining procedure. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 47 the Supreme

Court appraised Rule 35 and promulgated a strangely circular test for
determining whether the rule was or was not procedural. The test
given was this: "Does the rule really regulate procedure?" The great
stickler for procedure, Felix Frankfurter, gave his imprimatur to the
idea that we only need to define what procedure is in order to integrate
substance and procedure. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,'s Justice
Frankfurter pronounced the so-called "outcome determinative test"
for the Erie cases.
In order to distinguish substance from procedure, one must know
how they interrelate in the first place, and even more importantly,
what they are from the perspective of decision functions. To distinguish
between substance and procedure, for whatever purpose, is to have
made a jurisprudential assumption, albeit an implicit one, that must
be reluctantly extracted from the intellectual "fog" of those who presume to know the distinction.
H.L.A. Hart defined law as a complex set of rules that loosely
integrates primary and secondary rules. His model celebrates the union
46. The relationship between substance and procedure, as I have earlier indicated, is one
of the thorny problems of law. The mysteries about the distinction fade when we recognize that
procedure decisions are effectually constitutive process decisions, that substantive decisions are
public order decisions, and that principles of content and procedure are the only assured non-arbitrary way of integrating the goals of constitutive process with that of the public order to realize
the traditional objective of law: the realization of the common interest.
47. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
48. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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of substance and procedure. Hart's theory of rules views rules from
an internal vantage point. Policy-oriented jurisprudence maintains the
opposite point of view. Theorizing remains an impoverished, not to
say irrelevant, exercise if one cannot observe law-conditioned behaviors that practitioners for convenience label substance or procedure. The observational viewpoint about law lends law-related insights
that must invariably escape the internal perspective of law espoused
by Hart and his followers.
In the jurisprudence of the policy sciences, law is a process of
authoritative decision through which members of the community clarify
and implement their common interests. One of the central understandings of decisionmaking is that prescriptions we call law are often
normatively ambiguous, travel in pairs of complementariness, or come
in increasingly abstract levels of precision. Trying to know what the
law is is no mean feat regardless of the theory one embraces. According
to this view, since law is an instrument of policy, the function of
decision with which we are concerned is not what substantive law is,
in terms of some litmus test or other, but rather what is the design
of the entire process of law-maling: how is law made or prescribed?
Lawyers and courts are, of course, predominant instruments in the
processes of prescription, but from an observer's vantage point they
are not the only ones. The problem of application is intimately tied
to the questions how law is made, and how law is applied, Professor
McDougal, writing in the context of international law and human
rights, suggests what he views as the core challenge of prescription
and application. In his view the basic challenge is, namely, "to make
continual reference of the part to the whole in a contextual consideration of every particular question in the light of the overriding goals
and characteristics of the larger community. ' 49 Professor McDougal
continues:
Experience suggests that this necessary contextual examination of every particular problem, though perhaps occasionally
achievable by flashes of insight, may best be facilitated and
assured by the systematic employment of a comprehensive
set of principles of inquiry, both of content and procedure:
principles of content for spotlighting the relevant features
of the particular interaction and its community context; principles of procedure for the rational and economic identification exploration, and appraisal of possible solutions. 50

49. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 415 (emphasis added).
5n. Id.
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This statement highlights several important aspects about law and
procedure. First, that procedural law gains most systematic benefits
when the perspective of observation is maintained. Second, that procedure in the broad sense provides a means of resolving specific problems that are outcomes of social process. Third, that problems provoke decisional responses that frequently employ decisional procedures
of which the expectations codified in the rules of procedure are vital
to making real choices. Fourth, that the decisional responses may or
may not approximate the goals and expectations of the parties and
the larger community. Fifth, that inquiry into the nature of this process, including recommendations for normative guidance, may be of
enormous help not only in improving the processes of decisionmaking,
but also in providing deeper insights into the normative basis of procedure and its relationship to substantive law in a normatively ideal
system. The practical task of decisionmaking is the recurrent problem
of prescribing and applying law for particular cases and problems.
Decisional responses to problems, at least in law, represent policy
outcomes. Since policy outcomes reflect interests, the special normative challenge of decisional technique is whether it enables the accommodation of interests in particular instances. This is no mean feat,
and efforts to create a rational legal order flounder on the issues of
whether decision is responsive to problems, and if so how complete
is the response. To appraise this process we must know what application and prescription entail. We must be able to interpret or appraise
particular decisional practices to determine whether we intellectually
approximate a responsible discharge of what Professor McDougal calls
the application function. That function is explained as follows:
The responsible performance of the application function in
such instances may require a whole sequence of activities or
choices, including the exploration of the potential facts and
their larger context; the exploration of the potential policies
apparently relevant to the provisional focus upon the facts;
the characterization of the facts and determination of their
varying degrees of relevance; the selection from among the
potential policies of those to be applied and the detailed
relation of these policies to the facts regarded as relevant;
and finally, the formulation and projection of the decision,
with indication of measures appropriate to securing conformity. For an applier genuinely dedicated to the clarification
and implementation of the common interest, the necessities
of an informed and rational, yet still personal, choice must
stalk every act in this sequence. 51
51.

Id. at 416.
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In this perspective, civil procedure has the task of exploring and
clarifying potentially relevant policies that need to be harmonized in
the common interest as part of the decisional outcome. Civil procedure
fits largely, but not entirely, into the more inclusive decision function
of application. More accurately, the whole process of application is a
systematic link with the law-making, or prescribing process, itself.
The key functions of application cannot, therefore, be seen in isolation
of prescription and the core tasks of prescription itself, namely, the
systematic effort at ascertaining community expectations expressed
in particular prescriptions. Ambiguous or incomplete communications
might be supplemented by recourse to more inclusive values identified,
clarified, and evaluated for relevance in terms of their approximation
to the common interest, and the integration of "particular expectations
with basic community policies. ' '52 The critical question an observer
interested in application would ask is whether the intellectual
strategies used to apply law are best suited to maximize the rationality
and minimize the arbitrariness of the process of decisionmaking, of
which prescription and application are crucial functions. Policyoriented lawyers believe that the invention of a systematic set of
principles of content and procedure might provide useful guidelines
for the examination and evaluation of both the processes of prescription
and application. These principles include perennial principles of substance and procedure whose problems permeate the teaching and practice of procedural courses and the dynamics of litigation process. Principles of content and procedure in the policy-oriented sense provide
an anatomy of an open-ended intellectual frame, which has both
explanatory or mapping possibilities, as well as dynamic possibilities
about the relationship between procedure and substance. They provide
more precise keys to a functional integration of what is at least conventionally called procedure and substance. This essay provides only
a suggestive outline of principles that are more comprehensive and
that require more detailed explanation. This outline should, however,
be sufficient to serve as a normative standard to appraise the extent
to which any of the particular rules of civil procedure approximate
that standard.
XI.

PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURE

The principles of content recommended are those that provide guidance in "the choice of subject matter relevant to evaluating alternatives in policy open to a decisionmaker."

52.

Id. at 417.
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Principles of procedure suggest "agendas and techniques for bringing pertinent content to the focus of a decisionmaker's attention."
The framework that an observer might provide for a rational integration of the process of lawmaking and law application would, in the
policy-oriented framework, focus primarily on the process of prescription, the process of claim and decision and the process of application.
The intellectual strategies relating to the prescribing process may be
stated in the form of principles of content, and may be schematically
illustrated as follows:
Principlesof Content
I.

II.
III.

Principles relating to prescription or law-making are:
(1) ascertaining prescription;
(2) supplementing prescription; and
(3) interpreting expectations.
Principles relating to the process of claim, viewing
"legal" problems through lens of observer, relating
problems to context.
Principles relating to entire decision process invent
principles that enable all decision functions to be
tested for salience in shaping results or outcomes.
Principlesof Procedure

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

The Contextual Principle
Principle of Economy
Principle of Provisional Focus
The Principle of Clarified Focus
Principle of Observing Past Experience
Principle of Orientation to Conditions of Decision
Principle of Prediction of Probabilities
Principle of Appraisal and Invention of Options

These intellectual strategies are, of course, abstracted from a more
complex formulation of what law is and how it might be improved in
the case of a value-conditioned universe. The principles of content and
procedure are a device, or intellectual technique, that enables us to
appraise and evaluate the civil procedure process, or any other discrete
procedure process against some rational measure of performance. The
principles not only provide normative guidance to the process of decision itself, but also throw light on how we might appraise the nature
of procedure in terms of standards of explicit rationality. Debate about
those standards, however, is not foreclosed. What we debate is explicit
and subject to reformulation, change, or whatever, in terms of conscious, intellectual discussion. Debate is explicit about the relevance
of values. If we accept that the system of civil procedure is an outcome
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of the community's power process, and the rules, however aptly or
ineptly, justly or unjustly, allocate competences in ways that are of
bewildering complexity even to lawyers, and if we accept the principle
that responsible scholarship might promote the progress of law toward
improved rationality, then the interplay of power and values is a
crucial focus for a better understanding of civil procedure, and how
it might be made an even more important instrument in the delivery
of freedom and justice, now and in the future.
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